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This paper tests for evidence of political manipulation in the allocation of 
subsidized mortgage loans in Mexico during the 1990’s. First, I develop a 
baseline model of loan allocation across states as a function of housing 
need, eligibility for lending programs, and administrative capacity to deliver 
housing. Then, I add measures of political competitiveness to the model. 
Empirical results suggest that the two largest lenders generally allocated 
loans according to their eligibility criteria, granting more loans to states with 
more income- and employment-eligible households and poorer quality 
housing. Tests for political manipulation suggest that more loans were, in 
fact, granted in federal election years and in states where the ruling party did 
not perform well in the previous election. However, the numbers lack 
statistical significance. As a result, it can be assumed that political motivation 
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The extent to which political patronage affects the allocation of public resources is 
difficult to quantify. From Juan Perón in Argentina to Daniel Arap Moi in Kenya to 
the Tammany Hall Ring in 19
th century New York City, case studies of notorious 
patronage systems abound throughout history – in both the developing and the 
developed world. Attempts to imagine the counterfactual scenario, what public 
spending patterns would look like if officials had no interest in generating support 
from or providing rewards to their constituents – which roads and bridges would not 
have been built in their current locations, how many public employees would not 
have been hired, what contracts would have been awarded to different firms – would 
require a sufficiently long tabulation to determine which types of patronage 
spending, in its many forms, may just be “politics as usual.” 
 
Whether undertaken by democratically elected politicians attempting to entice voters 
or by leaders that came to power by force, government officials have strong 
incentives to manipulate the distribution of public resources for their own political 
gain. This raises the question: under what circumstances can governments get away 
with allocating public funds for overtly political reasons and under what 
circumstances is this ability curtailed? 
 
Mexico’s housing finance sector during the 1990’s offers an excellent case to test for 
constraints on patronage spending. From the end of the Mexican Revolution in 1917 
until the historic presidential election of 2000, the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI) held undisputed control over Mexican politics. The PRI was notorious for 
exploiting its authority over government resources to maintain its grip on power. It 
did everything from targeting food and development subsidies to key political 
constituencies, especially unions and the rural poor, to more direct tactics such as 
distributing toasters bearing the PRI logo in the weeks before elections. In the last 
decade of the 20
th century, however, two other parties emerged as viable political 
contenders. Several characteristics of the housing finance sector made it a potentially 
attractive arena in which to manipulate spending for electoral gains. 
 
During the 1990’s, three public and quasi-public federal agencies – INFONAVIT, 
FOVI, and FOVISSSTE – held near-monopolistic control over mortgage lending in 
Mexico, having considerable discretion over the distribution of subsidized mortgage 
loans. Private bank lending for mortgages was extremely scarce and expensive 
during most of this period. In addition, interest rates on mortgages issued by the 
public and quasi-public agencies were typically 10% to 15% lower than on the small 
number of mortgages issued by banks. Some of the mortgages granted also carried 
substantial down-payment subsidies. 
 
The potential recipients of the program were formally employed households with 
moderate incomes. They formed a large constituency, whose characteristics 
approximated the median voter. Yet the governance structure of the lending 
agencies, particularly the involvement of private-sector employers and large national Are Mortgage Loans the New Toasters     3 
 
 
developers, may have constrained the ability of the PRI to manipulate federal lending 
for political gain. 
 
In this paper, I examine data on the distribution of mortgage loans across Mexican 
states during the 1990’s to determine the extent to which federal agencies allocated 
loans to politically strategic states, rather than on the basis of underlying demand for 
housing. If federal agencies acted as benevolent social planners, without regard to 
electoral politics, they should have allocated loans across states based on housing 
demand, program eligibility, and the capacity to deliver housing. Alternatively, the 
government might have allocated loans to provide electoral benefits to the PRI, 
increasing lending during election years, targeting highly competitive states, or as 
rewards and punishments for past loyalty to the party. 
 
To identify the determinants of loan distribution, I use a panel dataset containing the 
number of loans granted in each state by the three dominant federal lenders each year 
from 1993 to 2000 as well as state-level data on the determinants of housing demand 
and political competitiveness in federal elections. I develop a baseline model of loan 
allocation by running regressions of the number of loans per 1,000 households on 
determinants of housing need, measures of income- and employment-eligibility, and 
administrative capacity, including fixed effects for regions and years. To test for 
political manipulation, I add measures of electoral competitiveness from the previous 
federal election in each state to the baseline model. I use lagged election results to 
avoid possible endogeneity since the number of loans in the current year could affect 
election results in that year. 
 
Results of the regression analysis suggest that the major lenders generally allocated 
loans across states according to eligibility for the loans, the need for housing, and 
administrative capacity. The two largest lenders, INFONAVI and FOVI, both appear 
to have adhered to their eligibility criteria, granting more loans to states with higher 
shares of income- and employment-eligible populations and poorer quality housing. 
INFONAVIT issued fewer loans to states with largely rural populations, which are 
difficult for large-scale developers to serve. Only the lender serving public-sector 
workers, FOVISSSTE, seems not to have allocated loans based on its eligibility 
criteria. Somewhat surprisingly, the tests for political manipulation yield results 
small in magnitude and weak in statistical significance. Although INFONAVIT 
granted more loans in federal election years and FOVI issued more loans in states 
where the PRI did not perform well in the previous election, the size of the effects 
suggest that political motivations played a relatively small role in loan allocation 
decisions. 
 
The following section provides some background on the Mexican housing market 
and housing finance system during the period under study. After that comes a review 
of relevant existing literature. An examination of the incentives for and constraints 
on political manipulation of federal housing programs follows. There is then a 
description of the empirical strategy and data. Results of the analysis come next. A 
conclusion rounds out the paper. 4    Schuetz   
 
 
                                                
2.  Mexican Housing Markets, Mortgage Finance, and the 
Political System 
 
In this section I provide a brief overview of the elements of Mexico’s housing 
markets, mortgage finance, and political system that are relevant to the analysis 
presented in this paper. For more comprehensive reviews of Mexican housing 
markets and housing policies, see Joint Center for Housing Studies (1997) or 
Schuetz, Belsky, and Retsinas (2004). 
 
2.1  Overview of the Mexican Economy and Housing Market 
 
The Mexican economy and financial industry experienced large fluctuations during 
the 1990’s. In late 1994, the rapid depreciation of the peso led to a severe recession, 
with high rates of unemployment, decreased household incomes, and a general crisis 
in the financial sector. This led to severe repercussions for private mortgage lending. 
During the peso crisis, banks experienced mortgage default rates of nearly 80%. 
Commercial lending for mortgages virtually disappeared in the following years and 
had barely started to recover a decade later. 
 
The lack of private capital for housing construction and purchase during the late 
1990’s was particularly problematic given the country’s rapid household growth 
during this period. The population grew from about 81 million in 1990 to just under 
100 million in 2000. With approximately 700,000 to 800,000 new households 
forming each year, this growth generated an estimated need for nearly 750,000 new 
housing units annually. However, new housing production was at less than half this 
level. As a result, many young couples continued to live in homes occupied by 
parents and extended families, leading to high rates of overcrowding. In 2000 
approximately 48% of households reported more than 2.5 occupants per bedroom 
(Schuetz et al., 2004). 
 
Despite the strong potential demand for housing resulting from population growth, 
the highly unequal distribution of income has made it difficult for many households 
to afford adequate housing. As shown in Figure 1, about one-quarter of households 
earn less than two times the legal minimum wage.
1 In developed countries, the 
poorest households typically resort to low-quality rental housing. However, the 
rental housing market in Mexico is quite small and underdeveloped at all quality 
levels (an estimated 13% of households rent) owing to a lack of capital for the 
development and purchase of rental properties, a legal environment strongly 
protective of tenants, and relatively low rates of return on rental housing compared to 
other types of assets (Schuetz et al., 2004). Moreover, for at least the last 30 years, 
Mexican housing policies and subsidies have been targeted primarily at owner-
occupied housing and at middle-income households, as explained in more detail 
below. Lacking affordable rental housing or direct tenant-based assistance, the 
 
1 Because of rapid inflation, prices of many goods in Mexico are estimated in multiples of the 
federal legal minimum wage (salarios minimum), which is indexed to inflation. Are Mortgage Loans the New Toasters     5 
 
 
poorest households rely on self-built housing, which typically lacks clear land titles, 
is not formally connected to urban services, and is financed primarily with cash. 
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2.2  Housing Finance System 
 
The type of housing finance that is available to Mexican households is sharply 
segmented by income. In the wake of the peso crisis, private capital withdrew from 
the market and tightened lending standards to the point that only the wealthiest 5% 
of households could qualify for or afford bank-issued loans. Throughout the 1990’s, 
the vast majority of housing finance was provided by a small number of public or 
publicly mandated agencies, which offered subsidized mortgage loans to households 
earning between two and ten times the minimum wage and met certain employment 
qualifications (discussed in more detail below). 
 
As shown in Figure 2, 93% of all mortgage loans issued during the 1990’s originated 
from one of the three largest federal lenders. The predominant mortgage lender is the 
Instituto del Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores (INFONAVIT), a 
mandatory pension program for private sector workers that is funded by a 
compulsory contribution by employers of 5% of wages. INFONAVIT issued an 
average of just under two-thirds of mortgage loans during the 1990’s.
2  The second 
                                                 
2 Each year INFONAVIT announces a maximum loan value, determined by the price of a 
newly constructed house of standard quality and size. Virtually all loans issued by the major 6    Schuetz   
 
 
largest mortgage lender, responsible for about 20% of loans in the 1990’s, was the 
Fondo de Operacion y Financiamento a la Vivienda (FOVI), which was established 
in 1963 as a trust fund to channel federal government funds and donations and loans 
from the World Bank to housing. The third largest lender, with just under a 10% 
market share, was the Fondo de la Vivienda del Sistema de Seguridad Social de los 
Trabajadores del Estado (FOVISSSTE), a pension program similar to INFONAVIT, 
but serving public sector workers. Not only were these lenders practically the only 
source of mortgage lending available to moderate-income households, but they also 
offered much more favorable loan terms than the few banks still willing to lend. 
INFONAVIT’s interest rates are legally capped at 4% to 6% above inflation, while 
inflation-adjusted interest rates from banks during this period averaged about 20%. 
Both FOVI and FOVISSSTE also offered similarly subsidized interest rates, and 
some of the loans granted by FOVI carried initial down-payment subsidies of up to 
80,000 pesos, in 2000 terms (Softec 2003). 
 
 














































































































                                                                                                                   
public lenders are granted for exactly the pre-set maximum, resulting in almost no variation in 
loan size. In this paper I use the number of loans rather than the value as the key indicator of 
loan supply. Are Mortgage Loans the New Toasters     7 
 
 
titution in 1917. 
2.3 Political  System 
 
Mexico has a federal governance system, led at the national level by a president and 
bicameral legislature, and at the state level by governors and state legislatures. 
Federal elections are held every three years: the president is elected for a six-year 
term.
3 Senators have a six-year term. Representatives to the Chamber of Deputies 
have three-year terms. The Mexican constitution limits all elected officials (federal, 
state, and municipal) to a single term (McDonald and Ruhl, 1989, Skidmore, 2001). 
For most of the 20
th century, the PRI completely dominated the political system. 
However, beginning with the disputed presidential election of 1988, the PRI faced 
growing competition from two of the opposition parties, the center-right Partido 
Acción Nacional (PAN) and the center-left Partido de la Revolución Democrática 
(PRD).
4 As shown in Figure 3, the PRI lost vote share in each of the federal 
elections during the 1990’s, culminating in the historic election of the PAN 
presidential candidate, Vicente Fox, in 2000 – the first non-PRI president to be 
elected since the adoption of the current cons
 















































Source: Calculations using data from CONAFOVI 1993-2000 
 
                                                 
3 Unlike the U.S. system, the president is elected by a straight popular vote. 
4 A number of other minor parties consistently field candidates in federal elections, but they 
obtain a very small share of the vote and are not relevant for this analysis. See McDonald and 
Ruhl (1989) for a discussion of other parties. 8    Schuetz   
 
 
3. Existing  Literature 
 
This paper draws on several strands in previous literature: determinants of “good 
governance,” political budget cycles, patronage spending patterns, and lobbying by 
special interest groups. Below I briefly discuss the relation of this paper to each of 
these strands. 
 
In its broadest application, this paper addresses the question of whether political 
institutions and governments act benignly in the interest of their citizens, in the so-
called “good governance” model. A wide range of theoretical and empirical papers 
have examined this question in various contexts. Among the theoretical literature, 
Caselli and Morelli (2004) argue that because “low-quality” citizens have greater 
incentives to run for elected office, if the legitimate rewards to holding office are not 
sufficiently high, the equilibrium quality of elected officials will be low. 
 
More generally, Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) posit that elites will assent to 
democratization only when the anticipated costs of democracy (i.e. redistributive 
policies) are limited or when they are threatened by social unrest that cannot be 
mitigated by other means. Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) stress that the extent to which 
political institutions are vulnerable to subversion for individuals’ or corporations’ 
private benefits is a key determinant of the appropriateness of government regulation 
versus private litigation as a means of protecting property rights. 
 
Two recent empirical papers use cross-national data to evaluate which characteristics 
affect the adoption of “good government” and more efficient policy outcomes. La 
Porta et al (1999) find that countries that are poor, are close to the equator, have 
ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous populations, have legal systems not based 
in Anglo common law, and have large proportions of Catholics and Muslims tend to 
have inferior government performance, measured by a variety of indicators. In 
testing for institutional factors that affect the efficiency of fiscal decentralization, 
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) find that strong national political parties 
significantly improve economic outcomes by aligning local and national policy 
interests. While these papers address the determinants of efficient and honest 
government behavior either through theoretical models or by empirical comparisons 
across different countries, in this paper I examine how institutional structures of 
public agencies within the same country may affect the degree to which officials 
behave in the best interests of their constituents. 
 
The second relevant strand of literature, which focuses on political budget cycles, 
identifies the tendency of governments to manipulate economic policies during 
election years in order to influence voters’ decisions. By cutting taxes and increasing 
spending, incumbents attempt to induce economic growth and reduce unemployment 
immediately preceding the election (Rogoff 1990; Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen, 
1997). Most literature discusses general policy instruments aimed at affecting broad 
macroeconomic conditions, but some empirical work examines more targeted 
spending, including social welfare programs (Brown and Hunter, 1999) and crime Are Mortgage Loans the New Toasters     9 
 
 
prevention (Levitt, 1997). Political budget cycles assume that politicians attempt to 
impress voters with a sense of their competence at managing the economy, thus 
ensuring their re-election. 
 
The long literature on patronage spending can be divided into three related types, all 
of which are relevant in Mexico’s political history: corporatism, clientelism, and 
direct vote-buying. Corporatism refers to the co-option of formal interest groups by 
the government, either through positive inducements of the groups and their 
members, or constraints through which the groups’ actions are controlled. The post-
revolutionary government in Mexico has historically used inducements to ensure 
support from key interest groups, particularly labor unions and groups of peasants or 
campesinos (Collier and Collier, 1979, Klesner, 2001). Though the federal 
government’s control has weakened in recent decades as Mexican states began to 
push for greater decentralization, Ward and Rodriguez (1999) point out that even in 
the mid-1990’s, the federal government retained control of most major spending and 
distributed it to groups that provided key political support to the PRI machine. 
 
Clientelism also involves a system of providing material rewards in exchange for 
political support, but the actors being induced are individual voters or informal 
groups, generally identified either geographically or through common characteristics. 
In Mexico, clientelism has taken the form of several large scale social development 
programs aimed at shoring up support of voters in the PRI’s traditional base, 
particularly among peasants and the urban poor. Policies such as the Program for 
Rural Development Investments (PIDER), the Village Food Store Program 
(CONASUPO-COPLAMAR), and urban consumer food subsidies for tortillas and 
milk targeted broadly defined constituencies and were administered through local 
clientelistic networks (Fox 1994). 
 
The social development program that has arguably received the most criticism for 
being distributed in blatantly political ways is the National Solidarity Program, or 
PRONASOL, which was initiated by President Carlos Salinas after his disputed 
victory in 1988. According to Dresser (1991), PRONASOL represented a shift from 
broad-based economic intervention – wage controls and generalized subsidies – to 
“strategic, targeted, compensatory intervention” aimed at the urban poor, who had 
voted for the leftist PRD candidate, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, in the 1988 presidential 
election. Fox (1994) points out that 12% of PRONASOL’s budget in 1992 went to 
the small state of Michoacán, the main base of the PRD. Bruhn (1996) conducts a 
very simple statistical analysis of the amount of PRONASOL spending per capita by 
state and concludes that spending does not depend on state socioeconomic 
characteristics, but is positively correlated with the strength of the PRI vote in 1988. 
The empirical studies of PRONASOL rely largely on qualitative analysis or small 
sample, fairly simplistic statistical analysis. 
 
The final form of patronage spending, direct vote-buying in the immediate run-up to 
elections, has been widely documented in the popular press (see, for example, 
Corchado and Iliff, 2000, and Global Exchange 2000). One recent academic study by 10    Schuetz   
 
 
Schedler (1999) identifies the practices by the PRI of distributing toasters, bicycles, 
and washing machines to potential voters in the weeks prior to elections. Vote-
buying is generally cheaper than manipulating funds for long-term social 
development programs, but is a more obviously unethical, if not actually illegal, and 
so may be less frequently used by governments attempting to maintain an appearance 
of legitimacy and transparency. 
 
The literature on patronage spending discussed so far generally assumes that the 
decision to allocate public resources strategically initiates with government officials 
or agencies. Alternatively, strategic allocation could be a response to lobbying on the 
part of special interest groups or other agglomerations of voters. There is an 
enormous amount of literature on the role of special interest groups, lobbying, and 
regulatory capture (see, for instance, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Becker and 
Stigler, 1974; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003; Grossman and Helpman 2001; Leung et al, 
2006; Peltzman, 1976; Posner, 1974, Stigler, 1971). 
 
Some of these works focus on the efforts of formally defined groups, whether of 
individuals, firms, or industries, while others use the concept of “special interest 
group” to refer to any group of voters with similar policy preferences, interests, 
demographic, or economic characteristics. There are several interest groups that 
might have been involved in this type of lobbying for a particular distribution of 
mortgage loans: the firms and unions that sit on the governing board of INFONAVIT 
and the developers that produce much of the housing that is purchased with 
subsidized loans. 
 
However, it is difficult to make precise predictions about what these groups’ 
preferences over geographic distribution of the loans would be. Thus, it is hard to 
test explicitly to determine if loan allocations were the result of their lobbying. A 
slightly different interpretation of the concept would be that individual state 
governments (or state-level PRI officials) engaged in lobbying with the federal 
agencies. Since the incentives of the federal government and national party to 
respond to state lobbying efforts are likely to align closely with the incentives for 
patronage spending, it would not be possible to distinguish empirically between 
these two possible explanations. 
 
 
4.  Incentives and Constraints for Patronage Spending 
 
In this paper, I examine the potential for patronage spending in an unusual social 
program in Mexico during the 1990’s: subsidized mortgage loans. During this 
period, the ruling political party had both the ability to manipulate federal spending 
and the incentives to do so. The federal housing finance programs in question have 
some characteristics that make them particularly attractive for patronage. Other 
characteristics may act as constraints or limitations on the influence of electoral 
politics. 
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4.1  Incentives and/or Ability for Patronage Spending 
 
The structure of Mexico’s political system and the increasing political 
competitiveness during the 1990’s offers an appropriate setting to test the model of 
politically strategic social spending. As discussed in the previous section, the federal 
constitution limits all elected officials to a single term in office. Theoretically, such 
term limitations would reduce the incentive for incumbent officials to allocate social 
spending for future electoral gains since they could not benefit directly in successive 
elections. However, the complete dominance (until very recently) of the PRI has 
created a system of incentives for strong party discipline. Elected officials that 
demonstrate loyalty to party leadership while in office are likely to be rewarded by 
candidacy for higher office or higher bureaucratic positions (Dresser, 2003, 
Enikolopov; and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Ward and Rodriguez, 1999). Thus, incumbents 
have an incentive to distribute social spending to locations that are politically 
strategic for the party as a whole rather than showing loyalty to their own 
constituents. 
 
Strong party discipline combined with prohibitions on reelection implies that voters 
cast their votes as party endorsements rather than as endorsements of a particular 
candidate. Citizens voting retrospectively will vote for the incumbent party (in all 
elections during this period, the PRI) if their lives improved in the recent past. 
Otherwise, they will vote for the opposition. Thus, the incentives for strategic social 
spending also rely on the existence of viable political competition. A one-party 
system with no challengers is guaranteed to retain control and so may not need to 
motivate voters (although it may do so to pre-empt the emergence of competitors). 
As shown in Figure 3, the PRI faced increasing competition from the PAN and PRD 
during the 1990’s, particularly in the latter part of the decade. Not only did the PRI 
have control of federal agencies, and thus had the opportunity to allocate social 
spending strategically; the growing political competition offered particular 
motivation to do so. 
 
Federal housing programs in Mexico during the 1990’s would have been an 
attractive arena for patronage spending for two reasons. First, the product being 
distributed – subsidized mortgage loans – was highly desirable, scarce, and of 
considerable value, so that receipt of a loan should have engendered a strong sense of 
gratitude and loyalty from the beneficiaries. Second, the potential base of loan 
recipients was a large and politically valuable constituency. Because of possible 
spillover effects, the electoral consequences could extend beyond the recipient 
households. It should be noted the Mexican government may have chosen to engage 
in political manipulation with other types of spending, as well. I cannot test for 
patronage among non-housing subsidy programs, but do not exclude that possibility. 
 
As described below, the demand for subsidized mortgage loans in Mexico was very 
strong during the time period in question. The small capacity of the rental market and 
the scarcity of lending from private capital markets in the wake of the peso crisis 
gave the three federal agencies a virtual monopoly on mortgage loans. Since the 12    Schuetz   
 
 
1970’s, these mortgage loans were essentially the only housing subsidies. Thus, they 
were the only available tool if the government wished to intervene in the housing 
sector. 
 
One of the unusual characteristics of mortgage loans compared with other forms of 
social spending that could be used for political gain is their relatively large monetary 
value. The average price of a house purchased with one of the loans was 15 to 20 
times the legal minimum salary, or about 200,000 pesos, or US$20,000 in 2000 
terms. The interest rate on the loans provided by the three agencies was roughly 10% 
to 15% lower than those on bank loans, and some loans from FOVI carried up-front 
down payment subsidies, as well. Many of the products or services that have been 
documented as examples of politically-motivated spending or vote-buying, such as 
toasters or food assistance, are of a much smaller value. The receipt of a big-ticket 
item would be more likely to influence the recipient’s voting behavior. 
 
The nature of mortgage loans may also generate spillover effects that could create 
political gains beyond the immediate recipient. The construction of a house is highly 
visible to surrounding communities and durable, similar to infrastructure or public 
works projects. They can thus serve as a constant reminder of the government’s 
investment in the neighborhood. Moreover, the receipt of a scarce and highly 
desirable mortgage loan carries not only financial benefits but also social cache 
amongst the recipient’s family and friends since it frequently enables young couples 
to leave their parents’ or extended families’ home and establishes a newly 
independent household (author interview with Sebastian Fernandez, 2004). The 
spillover reputational effects could thus enhance the desirability to manipulate 
distribution of mortgage loans for political purposes. 
 
The potential beneficiaries of subsidized mortgage loans – those households that 
were eligible by income and employment status – formed a large and politically 
important segment of the population. INFONAVIT serves formally employed private 
sector workers, whose employers contribute to the fund, while FOVISSSTE serves 
public sector workers. Eligibility for FOVI loans is not tied to employment status. 
Formally employed private and public sector workers as well as those employed in 
the informal labor market are eligible to apply for loans (although informal workers 
often have difficulty meeting the underwriting criteria). All three lenders target loans 
to households earning between two and 10 times the minimum wage.  As shown in 
Figure 1, approximately 60% of all households fall into the range of eligible 
incomes. 
 
Owing to data limitations, it is impossible to determine the exact number of 
households meeting both income and employment criteria (or the number of 
contributors to INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE). However, applying the overall rate 
of informal employment (50%) to the share of income-eligible households yields a 
conservative estimate of 30% of total households. Moreover, many of the poorest 
households and those engaged in informal employment live in rural areas so the 
share of eligible households in urban areas may be as high as 75% (Softec, 2003). Are Mortgage Loans the New Toasters     13 
 
 
                                                
While the skewed income distribution in Mexico makes it difficult to identify any 
segment of the population as the “middle class,” the types of households eligible for 
federal lending programs – neither the very poor nor the very rich, formally 
employed, and predominantly located in urban areas – comes very close to 
describing the median voter. 
 
4.2  Constraints on Political Manipulation 
 
Despite all the characteristics of housing finance that would enhance the appeal to 
the ruling party of trying to manipulate spending for political gains, some constraints 
exist on the government’s ability to alter lending patterns. In particular, the 
governance structures and oversight of at least two of the major lenders could limit 
the PRI’s control over loan distribution. 
 
INFONAVIT is a quasi-public agency managed by a director general that is 
appointed by the president of Mexico, subject to the approval of the federal General 
Assembly. It has a tripartite board composed equally of members from three sectors: 
private sector employers contributing to the fund, unions representing the employees 
of these companies, and the federal government.
5  
 
Although firms of all sizes contribute to INFONAVIT’s fund, most of the board 
members representing employers are drawn from large regional or national 
companies, which have branches and employees distributed throughout the country. 
These firms are likely to prefer that loan distribution reflects the location of their 
workers rather than political concerns. 
 
FOVI is also subject to non-governmental oversight since much of the original 
funding was provided by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, 
and the Mexican central bank. Continuing involvement and surveillance from these 
organizations is likely to inhibit blatantly corrupt practices in loan distribution. Only 
FOVISSSTE, as the institution serving public sector workers, is not directly subject 
to some non-governmental or external scrutiny. It also has the smallest group of 
potential beneficiaries of the three major lenders (Softec,2003; Schuetz et al, 2004; 
World Bank, 2002b; author interview with Sebastian Fernandez, 2004). 
 
A second moderating influence may stem from the role of developers serving as a 
conduit for loans from agencies to households. Loans from all three lenders are used 
almost exclusively for newly constructed homes built by private developers, most of 
which are large firms that operate on a regional, if not national, scale (Softec, 2003). 
As in many other countries, developers tend to purchase large parcels of land in 
major urban markets well in advance of expected development. Because of their 
 
5 INFONAVIT is not technically a public entity and its funds do not come from public 
sources. However, it is generally regarded in Mexico as a federal agency since it was formed 
under a mandate from the government and one-third of the board members are government 
representatives. 14    Schuetz   
 
 
extensive land banks and, to a lesser extent, because staff resources are distributed 
across large and mid-sized cities throughout the country, it seems plausible that 
developers would prefer housing loans to be dispersed across various housing 
markets rather than highly concentrated in key political sites. The traditional 
relationship between large developers and lenders, particularly INFONAVIT, has 
been quite close, with the developers playing a key intermediary role in the lending 
process. Thus, it is likely that the developers’ preferences over the geographic 
distribution of their work will influence INFONAVIT’s decisions on how to allocate 
loans across states. 
 
 
5.  Empirical Strategy and Data Description 
 
In order to identify whether federal electoral politics affected the geographic 
distribution of subsidized mortgage loans, I first model loan allocations across states 
based on underlying housing need and program eligibility, then add measures of 
electoral competitiveness. Using a panel dataset with annual observations on all 32 
states from 1995 to 2000, I estimate regressions on the number of loans per 1,000 
households issued by each of the three major lenders as a function of state-level 
characteristics. Summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Variable Means and Standard Deviations 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
All 3 lenders, Loans/1000 
households  8.982 5.753 1.174  29.316 
INFONAVIT, Loans/1000 
households  6.242 4.436 0.786  22.865 
FOVI, Loans/1000 households  2.359  2.181  0.0  10.572 
FOVISSSTE, Loans/1000 
households  0.380  0.404 0.0 2.385 
Prior electoral margin, pct.  18.275  10.445  0.898  43.784 
Prior PRI vote share, pct.  46.602  7.555  23.10  59.574 
Annual pop growth rate  1.680  1.039  0.246  7.356 
Pct. employment-eligible 
households  44.299 10.862 21.201 68.594 
Pct private-sector eligible 
households  40.26  10.682 16.961 65.269 
Pct public-sector eligible 
households  6.692 3.181 2.070  19.491 
Pct income eligible  43.246  11.210  6.828  63.330 
Pct pop, 20-35 years  25.541  2.124  21.713  30.573 
Pct pop, 36-50 years  15.563  1.159  13.308  19.517 
Pct poor quality housing  13.679  10.084  0.659  43.175 
Pct pop in towns under 15,000  43.174  19.348  1.168  78.583 
Total population  2,945,760 2,537,213  375,450 13,100,000 
Total households  648,513 559,977  87,481 2,848,992 
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5.1 Empirical  Strategy 
 
If federal mortgage lenders act as benevolent social planners, unmoved by political 
concerns, they should allocate loans across states based on demographic 
characteristics that drive housing demand, eligibility for the various lenders, and 
administrative capacity to deliver new housing.
6 States with higher population 
growth rates will have more demand for new housing as will those with relatively 
large numbers of younger residents that are at the age of forming new households. 
Demand for new housing will also be higher in states with relatively poor quality 
housing in need of replacement. 
 
Eligibility for mortgages from each of the three major lenders should be reflected in 
the allocation of loans. All three lenders should grant more loans in states with a 
larger share of income-eligible households (those earning between two and ten times 
the minimum salary). INFONAVIT should issue more loans to states with more 
formally employed private sector workers, and FOVISSSTE should lend more in 
states with many public sector workers. Because virtually all mortgages are issued to 
purchase newly-constructed units built by developers, states where much of the 
population lives in rural areas will lack the administrative capacity to provide 
developer-built housing.
7 Finally, to the extent that both developers and employers 
contributing to INFONAVIT prefer to distribute development across many housing 
markets rather than saturate the few largest markets, we might expect that smaller 
and mid-sized states would receive relatively more loans than the largest states 
because of their smaller populations. 
 
To test whether the electoral strategies of the PRI affected the distribution of loans, I 
then add several different measures of political competitiveness to the baseline 
model. According to political budget cycle literature, lending is likely to be higher in 
federal election years than in non-election years. If loans are granted to encourage 
households to vote for the PRI, one strategy would be to target competitive states in 
which the margin between the PRI and the nearest rival is close enough that 
additional social spending might be perceived as being able to have an impact on the 
outcome of the election. Another strategy would be to allocate more loans to states in 
which the PRI previously performed poorly in order to build greater party support. 
Conversely, a third strategy might be to distribute loans to states with strong PRI 
support. This could be viewed as shoring up core areas of support or offering 
rewards to voters for their loyalty in the past. In order to avoid endogeneity problems 
 
6 Although the agencies set annual targets for the number of loans to be granted per state, they 
do not have formal written rules that describe how they arrive at these targets. In the baseline 
model, I apply household-level eligibility criteria and general indicators of housing need to 
estimate demand for loans at the state level, using data sources that would have been available 
to the agencies. 
7 Because of the cost of transporting materials and labor, developer-built housing is financially 
infeasible in communities with a total population of fewer than 15,000 inhabitants (Softec 
2003; Schuetz et al 2004). 16    Schuetz   
 
 
caused by using voting results and social spending from the same year, I use results 
from the previous federal election to model current spending. Prior election results 
will likely be a weaker indicator of political competition than polling data shortly 
before the election, but polling data are not available. 
 
The baseline model of loan allocation for state i in year t based on housing need, 
program eligibility, and administrative capacity is described in Equation 1. Equation 
2 includes political measures. Results from the previous election are noted as “E – 
1”. 
 
Loans/1000 householdsit = f(Annual pop. growth rateit, Percent employment-
eligibleit, Percent income-eligibleit, Percent youngit, Percent poor-
quality housingit,Percent ruralit Small stateit,, Medium stateit, Region 
and year fixed effects) 
(1) 
Loans/1000 householdsit = f(Federal election yearit, Margin of victoryiE-1, PRI 
vote shareiE-1, Annual pop. growth rateit, Percent employment-eligibleit, 
Percent income-eligibleit, Percent youngit, Percent poor-quality 




Although the dataset provides a panel of observations by state over time, I use 
regional rather than state fixed effects in the regressions in addition to year fixed 
effects. The demographic and income characteristics change very little within states 
over time. Because the political measures used are the lagged results from the 
previous election, they are constant over a three-year period. Thus, there is not 
sufficient variation in most of the independent variables to control for state fixed 
effects as well as the variables themselves. Rather, I control for seven regional fixed 
effects, using regional definitions created by Softec (2004). 
 
The Metro region includes the Federal District, Estado de México, Jalisco, Puebla, 
and Nuevo Leon. The Pacific includes Colima, Nayarit, and Sinaloa. The South 
includes Campeche, Chiapas, Morelos, Oaxaca, Tabasco, and Yucatán.  The Gulf 
incluyes Veracruz, Tlaxcala, and Tamaulipas. The Center includes Aguascalientes, 
Durango, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Michoacan, Queretaro, San Luis Potosí, and 
Zacatecas. The North includes Baja California, Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Sonora. 
Tourist includes Baja California Sur, Guerrero, and Quintana Roo. 
 
The regions are primarily geographic clusters although some reflect underlying 
economic characteristics (such as the Metro region, which contains all of the largest 
urban areas, and the Tourist region). To the extent that loan allocation varies across 
states based on industrial composition or geographic characteristics (such as 
proximity to the U.S. border or land quality, which affects agricultural production), 
the regional fixed effects should help correct for that unobserved heterogeneity. 
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5.2 Data  Description 
 
Data on the number of mortgage loans issued in each state by the three major lenders 
from 1993 to 2000 was provided by the Comisión Nacional de Fomento a la 
Vivienda (CONAFOVI). Data on population size, age distribution, income 
distribution by multiples of the minimum salary, and rural share of the population are 
drawn from the 1990 and 2000 Censo General de Población y Vivienda and the 1995 
Conteo de Población. 
 
The primary measure of housing quality is a composite index constructed using 
micro data from the 1990 and 2000 census. The index measures access to urban 
services, materials used to construct walls, floors, and roofs and the amount of living 
space. Methodology for the index was originally developed by Schteingart and Solis 
(1994) and used by the Joint Center for Housing Studies (1997) and Schuetz, Belsky, 
and Retsinas (2004). 
 
Housing materials are considered to be of good quality if the walls are constructed 
from brick, block, stone, or cement, the unit has non-dirt floors, and the roof is made 
of concrete, brick, or tabique, which are bricks of an adobe-like substance. Living 
space is deemed good if the house has a kitchen that is not also used for sleeping, a 
bathroom, and 2.5 or fewer people per bedroom. A value of one is assigned to each 
of the 10 characteristics for good quality, zero for poor quality, and the values are 
summed up to construct the index. 
 
Homes with index values of three or lower are deemed to be in need of replacement 
or significant upgrading. Homes with values of between four and six are considered 
to be in need of moderate upgrading. Those with values of between seven and nine 
need minor upgrading. An index value of 10 indicates that there are no problems. I 
also run robustness checks, shown in Appendix Table A.1, measuring housing 
quality by whether electricity is available inside the unit and whether sewerage is 
provided by way of connection to a public system or a septic tank. To obtain annual 
values for variables from the decennial census, I use a linear interpolation. The 
values change little even over a 10-year interval. 
 
Eligibility by employment status for INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE loans is 
estimated using data collected in biennial national surveys of household income and 
expenses, Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH 1992, 
1994, 1996, and 1998), and from the 2000 census. To determine overall employment 
eligibility, I construct a composite measure of position, occupational class, and 
industry.  
 
Household members giving their position as either non-agricultural worker or worker 
in a cooperative firm are counted as eligible by position.  Several occupational 
classes are counted as ineligible because they are typically informal workers: 
agricultural workers, unskilled day laborers, informal salespersons (vendedores 
ambulantes), personal service workers, and domestic servants. Workers in all 18    Schuetz   
 
 
industries except agriculture and repair services are counted as potentially eligible. I 
identify a household as employment-eligible if at least one member meets all three of 
the criteria described. Eligible households are then further divided into private-sector 
and public-sector eligible. A household in which at least one member listed his or her 
occupational class as civil servant or industry as public administration is counted as 
eligible for a public sector loan from FOVISSSTE. All other occupations and 
industries are considered private sector. 
 
Measures of political competitiveness are drawn from data collected by the Instituto 
Federal Electoral (IFE), which tracks state- and district-level voting records in 
federal elections. During the period examined, there were three legislative elections 
(1994, 1997, and 2000) and two presidential elections (1994 and 2000). In the 
regressions, a dummy variable indicates a federal election year. To measure the 
strength of the ruling party, I use the PRI’s share of total votes cast in the previous 
election. The measure of margin of victory is constructed as follows: 
 
Margin of victory = 100*|(PRI votes – max(PAN votes, PRD votes)/Total votes 
 
In all of the regressions shown, I use results from the Chamber of Deputies elections. 
The correlation between the results from the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, and 
the President (in 1994) for both political outcome measures is approximately 0.90 or 
greater so regressions using either the senate or presidential election results are 
essentially identical. Additional tests for the effects of prior elections decided by 
fewer than 30,000 or 50,000 votes, and for whether the PRI won the previous 
election, show no significant results, as shown in Appendix Table 2. 
 
 
6. Regression  Results 
 
6.1  Baseline Determinants of Mortgage Allocation 
 
The regressions suggest that two of the three major lenders – INFONAVIT and 
FOVI – generally allocated loans across states according to housing need and 
program eligibility, but it is less clear what criteria drove FOVISSSTE’s lending 
patterns. Table 2 presents regression results from several specifications on each of 
the three lenders’ allocations across all 32 states annually from 1995 to 2000. 
Column 1 shows results on the number of loans from all three lenders per 1,000 
households. Columns 2 and 3 show results on INFONAVIT’s loans. Columns 4 and 
5 present results on FOVI’s loans. Columns 6 and 7 show regression results on 
FOVISSSTE’s loans. 
 
INFONAVIT appears to have allocated its loans based on employment and income 
eligibility, housing need, and capacity to deliver housing. The share of households 
eligible for INFONAVIT loans, by income and employment status, is significantly 
positively correlated with the number of loans issued per 1,000 households. The 
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housing, another predictor of housing need. As anticipated, INFONAVIT makes 
fewer loans in states with predominately rural populations that are difficult for large-
scale developers to serve, and the number of loans per 1,000 households is 
decreasing in the share of the population living in communities of 15,000 or fewer 
inhabitants. The magnitude of all these relationships is fairly small. A 1% increase in 
the income-eligible population (the largest coefficient) is associated with an increase 
of approximately 0.15 loans per 1,000 households or less than one-tenth of a 
standard deviation, controlling for other variables. 
 
 
Table 2  Determinants of Major Lenders’ Allocation of Mortgage Loans by 
State, 1995-2000 
 
Dependent variable:                                    Mortgage loans per 1000 households 
Lender: All  lenders INFONAVIT FOVI  FOVISSSTE 
Variable:  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) 
1.103** 0.343  0.215  0.632*  0.644*  0.076 0.066  Annual pop  
    growth rate  (0.515) (0.418)  (0.389) (0.326)  (0.338) (0.047) (0.051) 
0.119**     0.014 0.013      Pct employment 
   eligible  (0.053)    (0.028)  (0.029)    
 0.092**  0.097***          Pct eligible private- 
   sector workers   (0.039)  (0.036)        
        0.003  0.002  Pct eligible public- 
    sector workers          (0.018)  (0.019) 
0.287*** 0.151**  0.144** 0.129***  0.130***  0.004  0.004  Pct income  
   eligible  (0.072) (0.062)  (0.056) (0.046)  (0.047) (0.006)  (0.006) 
0.262 0.027  -0.013 0.275  0.275 0.014  0.012  Pct pop, 20-35 
(0.316) (0.248)  (0.239) (0.171)  (0.174) (0.030)  (0.030) 
0.175 -0.034  -0.164 0.110  0.097  0.177*** 0.175***  Pct pop, 36-50 
(0.496) (0.441)  (0.328) (0.205)  (0.215) (0.063)  (0.062) 
0.265*** 0.144**  0.195***  0.108***  0.103***  0.005  0.008  Pct poor quality 
    housing  (0.064) (0.057)  (0.069) (0.033)  (0.033) (0.006)  (0.006) 
-0.067* -0.089** -0.102*** 0.018  0.018  0.006*  0.005*  Pct pop in towns  
   under 15,000  (0.039) (0.035)  (0.028) (0.018)  (0.019) (0.003)  (0.003) 
   2.463***    -0.151    0.160*  Pop under 1.5mi 
    (0.808)   (0.390)   (0.083) 
   2.311**    0.050    0.105*  Pop 1.5-3mi 
    (0.898)   (0.319)   (0.062) 
Region FEs?  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Year FEs?  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations  192 192  192 192  192 192  192 
R-squared  0.80 0.72  0.74 0.63  0.63 0.33  0.34 
There is one observation per state-year for all 32 states, 1995-2000. Robust standard errors 
clustered by state shown in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
The results also provide some evidence that developers, firms, or both groups prefer 
to spread the loans across many housing markets rather than concentrate them in a 
few of the largest areas. As shown in Column 3, INFONAVIT issues approximately 20    Schuetz   
 
 
2.3 to 2.4 more loans per 1,000 households in small states (with populations of less 
than 1.5 million) and medium sized states (with populations of between 1.5 and 3 
million) than in the largest states. The relatively simple models being tested in 
Columns 2 and 3 appear to have captured many of the important determinants of 
loan allocation. They explain nearly three-quarters of the variation in lending across 
states during this period. 
 
The pattern of loan distribution across states by FOVI also reflects income eligibility 
and housing need, with the weakly significant effect of population growth rates. The 
number of loans per 1,000 households is increasing in the share of income eligible 
households and share of poor quality housing. Results are statistically significant at 
the 5% level, but similarly small in magnitude. Since eligibility for FOVI’s loans 
does not depend on employment status, it is not surprising that there is no significant 
association between the share of workers in formal employment and the number of 
loans. FOVI does seem to target loans to faster-growing states although the 
coefficient on the annual population growth rate is significant only at the 10% level. 
Unlike INFONAVIT, there are no differences in per-household loan numbers 
according to the overall population of the state. This perhaps reflects the absence of 
pressure from national firms. As with the results for INFONAVIT, the models of 
FOVI’s lending provide a relatively good fit, explaining more than 60% of the 
variation in lending. 
 
The baseline models are least strongly predictive in identifying what criteria 
FOVISSSTE applied when allocating loans across states. The only variable that is 
statistically significant at the 5% level is the share of the population between 35 and 
50 years of age. The number of loans per 1,000 households increased on average by 
0.18 loans for every 1% increase in the share of population in this age range. It 
should be noted that this population is somewhat older than the usual age of 
household formation in Mexico, but may be more typical of the age of people 
working in the public sector. Surprisingly, there is no significant relationship 
between either the share of public sector employees in the state or the share of 
income-eligible workers and the number of loans.  
 
There is a positive association between the rural share of the population and loans, 
but the results are only weakly significant and the magnitude is very small (0.006 
additional loans per 1,000 households for 1% of rural population). As with 
INFONAVIT, FOVISSSTE appears to grant more loans to small and mid-sized 
states although the results are only significant at the 10% level. Of the three lenders 
examined, the models on FOVISSSTE’s loans explain by far the lowest share of 
variation. Only one-third of the total variation in lending is explained by the 
independent variables. 
 
6.2  Results on Politically Strategic Loan Allocation 
 
The results on regressions testing for various forms of politically strategic lending 
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years and more loans in close electoral races. However, the results are not consistent 
across lenders and the magnitude of the effects is small. 
 
In Table 3, Columns 1 through 3 show the results for INFONAVIT. Columns 4 
through 6 report results on FOVI. Columns 7 through 9 show results on 
FOVISSSTE. The first column in each lender group tests for increased lending in 
federal election years, using data from 1993 to 2000 in order to capture three election 
years. The second column tests the relationship between close previous elections and 
lending, using lagged election results from the 1994 and 1997 elections on lending 
between 1995 and 2000. The third column examines lending as a function of the 
PRI’s overall strength in the previous election during the same period. 
 
The results of regressions on INFONAVIT’s loans show some evidence of a political 
budget cycle, but do not show evidence of targeting loans to electorally strategic 
states. The regression in Column 1 shows higher lending per household in federal 
election years, significant at the 10% level, controlling for the variables included in 
the baseline model and a quadratic time trend (year fixed effects are omitted to avoid 
collinearity with the election year dummy). On average, INFONAVIT issued 0.47 
more loans per 1,000 households in election years, approximately one-tenth of a 
standard deviation. However, the agency did not grant more loans either to states 
with previously close races, as shown in Column 2, or to states where the PRI had a 
particularly weak electoral share, shown in Column 3. The coefficients on both the 
prior electoral margin and PRI’s share of the vote are statistically not different from 
zero. In magnitude, they are quite close to zero. The coefficients on variables from 
the baseline model are robust to the inclusion of the electoral competitiveness 
variables. 
 
Of the three major lenders, FOVI’s lending patterns appear to be most affected by 
electoral politics. The number of loans per household decreases with the margin of 
victory in the previous election, as shown in Column 5, although the results are only 
weakly significant. Statistically stronger results occur on the PRI’s overall strength 
in the state, shown in Column 6. The higher the PRI’s share of the vote in the prior 
election, the more loans were given per 1,000 households, controlling for the 
baseline variables. The magnitude of the electoral strength variable is quite small 
though an additional 1% in the PRI’s previous vote share is associated with a drop of 
0.07 loans per 1,000 households. There is no evidence that FOVI gave more loans in 
election years, shown in Column 4, with controls for a linear time trend. 
 
The results shown in the last three columns provide no evidence that FOVISSSTE 
alters its lending patterns as part of its federal electoral strategy. None of the 
coefficients of the three political variables included in the model – the dummy for 
federal election years, the prior electoral margin, or the prior PRI vote share – are 
statistically different from zero, nor do the coefficients on the baseline variables 
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Table 3 Influence of Electoral Strategies on Mortgage Allocation by State, 1995-2000 
 
Dependent variable:  Mortgage loans per 1000 households 
Lender INFONAVIT  FOVI  FOVISSSTE 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
   0.177      -0.061      Federal election yr  0.467* 
(0.230)     (0.176)      (0.042)     
 -0.004      -0.031*      0.004    Prior electoral margin, pct 
  (0.037)     (0.016)    (0.004)  
   0.004      -0.067**      0.003  Prior PRI vote share 
    (0.054)    (0.032)    (0.007) 
0.235 0.207  0.217  0.481**  0.587* 0.622**  0.027  0.082*  0.077*  Annual pop growth rate 
(0.323) (0.371)  (0.378)  (0.233)  (0.313) (0.311) (0.034) (0.045) (0.046) 
2.699***  2.505**  2.441***         Pop under 1.5mi 
(0.765)  (0.991)  (0.892)        
Pop  1.5-3mi  2.649***  2.331**  2.287**        
  (0.762)  (0.940)  (0.931)        
0.077**  0.097**  0.097***         Pct eligible private-sector 
(0.030)  (0.037)  (0.037)        
     -0.003  0.008  0.014        Pct employment eligible 
      (0.024) (0.029) (0.028)       
         0.015  0.004  0.003  Pct eligible public sector 
         (0.011)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
0.135** 0.144**  0.144**  0.119**  0.130*** 0.131***  0.003  0.004  0.004  Pct income eligible 
(0.056) (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.051)  (0.046) (0.041) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
Table 3 Continue… 
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Table 3 Continued 
 
-0.039 -0.003  -0.017  0.187  0.363** 0.346**  0.020  0.004  0.011  Pct pop, 20-35 yrs 
(0.263) (0.260)  (0.240)  (0.187)  (0.180) (0.163) (0.022) (0.031) (0.030) 
-0.236 -0.156  -0.161  0.166  0.180  0.078  0.141*** 0.169** 0.179***  Pct pop, 36-50 yrs 
(0.275) (0.365)  (0.311)  (0.272)  (0.208) (0.159) (0.048) (0.065) (0.060) 
0.188*** 0.196***  0.195***  0.109***  0.106*** 0.105***  0.005  0.005  0.005  Pct poor quality hsg 
(0.061) (0.073)  (0.071)  (0.039)  (0.035) (0.031) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
-0.116*** -0.100***  -0.103*** -0.004 0.031  0.032 0.005* 0.004  0.005  Pct pop in towns under 15,000 
(0.026) (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.023)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Year -1,160***      0.426**      0.007     
 (162.1)      (0.163)      (0.015)     
Year  squared  0.291***            
  (0.041)            
Region FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FEs  No  Yes  Yes  No Yes Yes No Yes  Yes 
Observations 256  192  192  256  192  192  255  192  192 
R-squared 0.70  0.74  0.74  0.45 0.64 0.65 0.20 0.33 0.33 
There is one observation per state-year for all 32 states. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show results for 1993-2000; all other columns show results 1995-2000.  
Robust standard errors clustered by state shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 





In allocating subsidized mortgage loans across states, it appears that Mexico’s 
dominant federal lenders responded primarily to housing demand and program 
eligibility rather than the electoral strategies of the PRI. The largest and most 
important agency, INFONAVIT, allocated more loans to states with high proportions 
of income- and employment-eligible households, high levels of poor quality housing, 
and relatively large urban populations. The second largest lender, FOVI, also granted 
more loans per household to states with more income-eligible households and poor 
quality housing. Only the lender responsible for public-sector employees, 
FOVISSSTE, did not appear to have reflected housing need and eligibility in its loan 
allocation. 
 
Rather surprisingly, electoral strategies seem to have played a relatively small role in 
federal lending during the 1990’s. INFONAVIT issued more loans in federal election 
years, but did not target the loans at politically competitive states. FOVI did give 
more loans to states with previously tight elections and where the PRI had previously 
performed poorly, but the magnitude of the politically motivated allocation was quite 
small. FOVISSSTE showed no signs of responding to federal electoral politics. 
 
Given the PRI’s well-documented practice of patronage spending and vote-buying 
and the appealing characteristics of mortgage loans, these results are quite striking. 
In the face of ever-increasing political competition, why would Mexican federal 
agencies refrain from allocating their loans in a way most likely to increase voter 
support for their party? First, the governance structures of the agencies may have 
constrained an overt politicization of lending or have created counter-pressures for a 
different type of distribution. In particular, the presence of large national firms on 
INFONAVIT’s board, and the role of regional or national developers in 
administering the loans, may have prevented the federal government’s 
representatives from allocating loans to political battleground states. Similarly, the 
oversight capacity of the World Bank and IADB may have unhibited the degree to 
which FOVI could manipulate its allocations. However, it is somewhat surprising 
that the agency with the least amount of non-governmental oversight, FOVISSSTE, 
showed the least evidence of political pressure. 
 
Two other possible reasons may explain the lack of evidence of political influence. 
Although the target population for federal loans more closely resembles the median 
voter than some other recipients of the PRI’s patronage and vote-buying activities, it 
is possible that the somewhat more affluent mortgage recipients were perceived as 
being less receptive to persuasion. Moreover, the loans are far more expensive to the 
government than the usual goods and services used for patronage. If the votes of 
large numbers of poor households can be swayed by gifts of toasters and bicycles, 
allocating high-value, long-term mortgage loans to moderate-income households 
would be an inefficient means of affecting elections. 
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Improved data in two respects would be desirable to test further whether lending 
serves political purposes. First, it is possible that the state is too broad a level of 
analysis and that spending for electoral gains at the municipal level would be a better 
targeted. Second, the measure of political competition used in this paper derives 
from previous election results, which may not accurately indicate the perceived 
closeness of current and future contests. The use of polling data shortly before 
elections would be preferable although such data are not currently available. Finally, 
it would be interesting to test for reverse relationships – does the receipt of federal 
mortgage loans affect the outcome of elections? Perhaps the PRI did not allocate 
mortgage loans strategically enough during the 1990’s – and paid the price for its 
omission. 
 
The housing industry and housing finance system in Mexico have evolved 
substantially since the period of this study, generally moving towards less direct 
government control and greater market orientation. The winner of the 2000 election, 
Vicente Fox from PAN, made modernization and expansion of the housing sector a 
signature issue during his term. Under his administration, FOVI evolved from a 
direct lender into a national mortgage bank, Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal, which 
channels funds to households through privately owned specialized financial 
institutions known as SOFOLes. INFONAVIT has shifted towards issuing a larger 
number of smaller loans, aimed at its lower wage contributors, while encouraging its 
higher-income contributors to use the subsidized loans as leverage to obtain 
additional funds from SOFOLes or commercial banks. 
 
The role of private capital markets has been growing although banks still issue a 
small share of total loans (Schuetz et al 2004). Perhaps in keeping with PAN’s 
traditionally more business-oriented positions, or simply weaker ties to the old 
political establishment, the Fox administration made a number of efforts to make the 
Mexican housing industry more market-driven and less dependent on direct public 
guidance or subsidy. Although production levels had not attained President Fox’s 
stated goal of 750,000 new houses per year by the end of his administration in 2006, 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1  Robustness Checks on Allocation of Loans, 1995-2000 
 
Dependent variable:                                             Mortgage loans per 1000 households 
Lender INFONAVIT  FOVI  FOVISSSTE 
Variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
0.353 0.415 0.422  0.444  0.723** 0.030  0.074  Annual pop  
      growth rate  (0.404)  (0.430)  (0.436) (0.287)  (0.347)  (0.036) (0.046) 
    0.021  0.007      Pct employment  
     Eligible        (0.025)  (0.026)     
0.043 0.095**  0.108**          Pct eligible private- 
     Sector  (0.034)  (0.038)  (0.042)         
        0.009  0.002  Pct eligible public- 
      Sector            (0.012)  (0.018) 
Pct income eligible  0.150**  0.104* 0.076*  0.120**  0.070** 0.002 0.005 
  (0.063) (0.055) (0.044) (0.052)  (0.035)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Pct pop, 20-35  -0.008  -0.169 0.034 0.175  0.111  0.030  0.010 
  (0.283) (0.246) (0.292) (0.207)  (0.181)  (0.023)  (0.026) 
Pct pop, 36-50  -0.082  -0.131  -0.080 0.116  0.080  0.156***  0.172***
  (0.425) (0.434) (0.418) (0.288)  (0.217)  (0.051)  (0.062) 
0.129**     0.115***  0.004   Pct poor quality  
     Housing  (0.053)      (0.040)    (0.005)   
Pct hsg w/ electricity    -0.174**      -0.059    -0.012 
   (0.082)     (0.036)    (0.007) 
 
Table A.1 Continue… 




Table A.1 Continued 
 
Pct hsg w/ sewerage      -0.067**         
     (0.028)         
-0.109*** -0.104*** -0.102*** 0.000 0.006  0.005**  0.005*  Pct pop in towns  
     under 15,000  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.032) (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Region FEs?  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FEs?  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  256 192 192 256  192  255  192 
R-squared  0.68 0.71 0.71 0.50  0.60  0.32  0.33 
 
There is one observation per state-year for all 32 states. Columns 1, 2, 5 and 7 show results for 
each year, 1993-2000.  The remaining columns show results for each year, 1995-2000. Robust 
standard errors clustered by state shown in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Are Mortgage Loans the New Toasters     31 
 
 




Mortgage loans per 1000 households 
Lender INFONAVIT  FOVI  FOVISSSTE 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9) 
-0.402    0.700    0.054      Prior margin 
< 50k votes  (0.862)     (0.469)     (0.090)    
 -0.557    -0.280    0.029   Prior margin 
< 30k votes    (1.105)     (0.428)     (0.113)  
   -0.401    -0.010     -0.048  PRI won 
prior 
election 
   (0.917)    (0.503)     (0.113) 
0.301 0.257 0.213 0.476  0.655* 0.632* 0.064 0.074 0.077  Annual pop 







         Pop under 
1.5mi 







         Pop 1.5-3mi 







         Pct eligible 
private-
sector (0.036) (0.038) (0.038)          
    0.011  0.014  0.014        Pct 
employment 
eligible 
    (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)      
       0.002  0.003  0.003  Pct eligible 













0.004 0.004 0.003  Pct income 
eligible 
(0.055) (0.057) (0.051) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
-0.066 -0.079 -0.010 0.368* 0.241 0.275 0.021  0.017  0.014  Pct pop, 20-
35 years  (0.229) (0.265) (0.249) (0.208) (0.188) (0.172) (0.034) (0.030) (0.031) 





















0.005 0.005 0.004  Pct poor 
quality 







0.020 0.015 0.018  0.006* 0.006* 0.006*  Pct pop in 
towns under 
15,000 (0.028) (0.032) (0.027) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Region FEs?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 192  192  192 
R-squared 0.74 0.74  0.74 0.64  0.63  0.63 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Observations per state-year for 32 states, 1995-2000. Robust standard errors clustered by state 
in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 